Part 1 of "The Seahawks: How Did We Get Here?"

THE DRAFT

Through the 2010, 2011, and 2012 draft classes, the Seahawks built an empire.

Many of these players were starters for years, and many made the pro bowl.

At least half of these can be classified as successes, and the "bust rate" is well under 50%.

Bolded players were elected to a Pro Bowl while with the Seahawks.

2010

1 - Russell Okung

1 - Earl Thomas

2 - Golden Tate

4 - Walter Thurmond

4 - EJ Wilson

5 - Kam Chancellor

6 - Anthony McCoy

7 - Dexter Davis

7 - Jameson Konz

2011

1 - James Carpenter

3 - John Moffitt

4 - KJ Wright

4 - Kris Durham

5 - Richard Sherman

5 - Mark LeGree

6 - Byron Maxwell

7 - Lazarius Levingston

7 - Malcolm Smith

2012

1 - Bruce Irvin

2 - Bobby Wagner

3 - Russell Wilson

4 - Robert Turbin

4 - Jaye Howard

5 - Korey Toomer

6 - Jeremy Lane

6 - Winston Guy

7 - JR Sweezy

7 - Greg Scruggs

That doesn't include undrafted players who were signed to the team during this time, like Doug Baldwin, Jermaine Kearse, Ricardo Lockette, etc.

Even players who didn't make the Pro Bowl were impactful: Golden Tate, Walter Thurmond, James Carpenter, Malcolm Smith, Bruce Irvin, Robert Turbin, Jeremy Lane, JR Sweezy, and many more drafted and undrafted players during this time frame started games and had successful stints with the Hawks.

One notable caveat: the Seahawks had earlier picks during these years, as well as multiple 1sts.

Then something changed.

From 2013-2018, the Seahawks' empire stagnated.

2013

2 - Christine Michael

3 - Jordan Hill

4 - Chris Harper

5 - Jesse Williams

5 - Tharold Simon

5 - Luke Willson

6 - Spencer Ware

7 - Ryan Seymour

7 - Ty Powell

7 - Jared Smith

7 - Michael Bowie

2014

2 - Paul Richardson

2 - Justin Britt

4 - Cassius Marsh

4 - Kevin Norwood

4 - Kevin Pierre-Louis

5 - Jimmy Staten

6 - Garrett Scott

6 - Eric Pinkins

7 - Kiero Small

2015

2 - Frank Clark

3 - Tyler Lockett

4 - Terry Poole

4 - Mark Glowinski

5 - Tye Smith

6 - Obum Gwacham

6 - Kristjan Sokoli

7 - Ryan Murphy

2016

1 - Germain Ifedi

2 - Jarran Reed

3 - CJ Prosise

3 - Nick Vannett

3 - Rees Odhiambo

5 - Quinton Jefferson

5 - Alex Collins

6 - Joey Hunt

7 - Kenny Lawler

7 - Zac Brooks

2017

2 - Malik McDowell

2 - Ethan Pocic

3 - Shaquill Griffin

3 - Lano Hill

3 - Nazair Jones

3 - Amara Darboh

4 - Tedric Thompson

6 - Michael Tyson

6 - Justin Senior

7 - David Moore

7 - Chris Carson

2018

1 - Rashaad Penny

3 - Rasheem Green

4 - Will Dissly

5 - Shaquem Griffin

5 - Tre Flowers

5 - Michael Dickson

5 - Jamarco Jones

6 - Jacob Martin

7 - Alex McGough

This is the make or break year for the 2018 Seahawks draft. Unlikely to be great, but Rasheem Green and Will Dissly could do it if they have great years.

Rashaad Penny can't really be a good pick at this point. Tre Flowers could redeem himself. Dickson great. Jamarco solid.

— Brian Nemhauser (@hawkblogger) September 13, 2021

It's hard to even read through some of these years.

The 2013 draft produced Willson as a consistent contributor... and that's about it.

The 2014 draft had some role players and names that stuck around for a while, the best of which may be Justin Britt (a league-average or slightly-above-average Center), but did not produce any Pro Bowlers for the Seahawks (does Pro Bowl alternate count?).

2015 is probably the best of the rest since Frank Clark and Tyler Lockett have had tangible achievements and are still producing in the league, but Clark did not get a second contract with the Seahawks and never reached a Pro Bowl with them either. Glowinski still plays in the league.

2016 was the Ifedi year: a failed experiment at RG/RT. Jarran Reed was a success at DT, but once again, barely earned a year past his rookie contract with the team. Though other role players have played (and continue to play) parts with different iterations of the Hawks (Vannett/Jefferson/Collins/Hunt), this draft didn't contribute any team cornerstones.

No Seahawks fan speaks of Malik McDowell, but the 2017 draft class has become notorious due to that selection. Griffin was a quality starter at CB who didn't earn a second contract, and while Pocic/Jones/Thompson/Moore all played bit roles, it's Chris Carson who stands out here, though his injuries will always leave us wondering what could have been.

The 2018 draft brought another sad realization from the 1st round in Rashaad Penny, who has barely seen the field through the years, while Green/Dissly/Griffin/Flowers/Jones have all been role players at points in time. Dickson is the lone Pro Bowler so far from this class. The punter.

Flowers' departure means Rasheem Green is the only defensive draft pick from the 2013-2018 drafts who's still on the Seahawks roster.

Jarran Reed is the only one who got a contract extension and he ended up in KC this offseason at a lower salary.

— Field Gulls (@FieldGulls) October 12, 2021

In the present, it is still too early to tell if many of the following players will be long-term successes.
There are questions in terms of fit, scheme, and goals for many of these players.

2019

1 - LJ Collier

2 - Marquise Blair

2 - DK Metcalf

3 - Cody Barton

4 - Gary Jennings Jr

4 - Phil Haynes

4 - Ugo Amadi

5 - Ben Burr-Kirven

6 - Travis Homer

6 - Demarcus Christmas

7 - John Ursua

2020

1 - Jordyn Brooks

2 - Darrell Taylor

3 - Damien Lewis

4 - Colby Parkinson

4 - DeeJay Dallas

5 - Alton Robinson

6 - Freddie Swain

7 - Stephen Sullivan

2021

2 - D'Wayne Eskridge

4 - Tre Brown
6 - Stone Forsythe

Going quickly through the picks from this list (that are still with the team), there are reasons for optimism.

Metcalf stands out like a sore thumb in this group: he is a bonafide superstar WR.

Blair has flashed at times as a quality secondary piece, but hasn't been healthy enough to be consistent.
Barton is a backup LB.
Haynes is a backup OL.
Amadi is a quality backup secondary player.
BBK is out for the year with a bad injury.
Homer is a PS-level RB.
Ursua is a PS-level WR.
Brooks is an average starting LB.
Taylor has flashed talent occasionally, but we just don't know what he is or could be yet.
Lewis is an average starting OG, and could be an above-average OG.
Parkinson has done nothing of note.
Dallas is a backup RB.
Robinson is similar to Taylor in that he has flashed occasionally, but there's more unknown than known.

Swain is a fine/good 4th WR.
Sullivan has done nothing of note.
Eskridge/Brown/Forsythe don't have enough time with the team for us to know anything yet.

Of those, reasonable 53-man roster pieces next season potentially could be Metcalf, Blair, Brooks, Taylor, Lewis, Dallas, Robinson, Swain, Eskridge, and Brown.

Now imagine this.

2013
2 - TE Travis Kelce (1 pick after Michael)
3 - DB Tyrann Mathieu
4 - OL JC Tretter
5 - DB Micah Hyde

2014
2 - WR Davante Adams (8 picks after Richardson)

3 - OG Gabe Jackson (17 picks after Britt)
5 - OL Corey Linsley

7 - DT  Shamar Stephen
7 - DE Shelby Harris

2015
5 - DT Grady Jarrett
5 - WR Stefon Diggs
6 - DB Quandre Diggs
6 - WR/TE Darren Waller

7 - OT Trent Brown

2016
2 - DT Chris Jones (6 picks after Ifedi)
2 - RB Derrick Henry
3 - OG Joe Thuney
3 - DB Justin Simmons
4 - QB Dak Prescott

5 - DT Matthew Ioannidis

There are many, many more, but since hindsight is 20/20, this is an entirely hypothetical exercise, and its usefulness has its limits.

We are simply addressing star players who were taken after many of the picks that PCJS made in multiple drafts, some of which ended up on past or current Seahawks teams (Jackson is the team's current starting guard, and Diggs is possibly the one bright spot of the current iteration's secondary).

The major caveat here is that most teams passed on these players multiple times, and if they had a chance to redo their drafts, none would look the same.

Still, the bust rate from 2013-2018 is... disheartening, to say the least.

Given that the massive success of three total draft years (2010-2012) developed the core of a team that went to back-to-back Super Bowls and the playoffs more often than not, it doesn't take more than a few great drafts to put a team into contention, as long as the other factors around that team are in place.

The biggest questions are:
(1) Have PCJS been drafting the best talent available?
(2) Have PCJS been drafting within their core philosophies?
(3) Have PCJS been considering quantity over quality?

After looking through the results of the last few years, what do you think?

The Path Forward: the Seahawks & Russell Wilson

Given that I am a Seahawks fan, it is apropos to dive WAY too deep into a path forward for Russell Wilson.

Brian Schottenheimer is gone, and the next offensive coordinator and playcaller will change everything about this team, most likely attempting to refocus the team towards Pete Carroll's main philosophies.

Pete always starts with one of his catchphrases: "it's all about the ball", which roughly translates to (1) create turnovers on defense, (2) prevent turnovers on offense, and (3) play ball control through a physical run game. Other core aspects include a defense that consistently stops the run and limits explosive plays, as well as an offense that creates explosive plays.

Given those items, plus the fan base's desire to "let Russ cook" contrasted with Pete's desire to "run the ball more", it's time to see what would unlock Russell Wilson's best.

Volume

One way to view the "cooking" catchphrase is to increase volume (total amount and opportunity) of passing plays. This year, Russell averaged about 35.88 passing attempts per game, the highest number of his career.

Did Brian "let Russ cook"? By this standard, yes.

Was it Pete's flavor? Not so much, as wee can see from the next graph.

Scoring Efficiency

Pete Carroll LOVES efficiency in football. Throughout Russell's career, he has raved about the quarterback's performance after efficient games, which don't necessarily correspond to high volume passing attacks.

Russell's most efficient year in terms of passing touchdown's per interception thrown was 2019 (6.2 to 1), and it wasn't especially close. That fell to a rate of 3.08 TD's per INT this year, which isn't "bad" by an NFL standard, but is still less than half as efficient (in terms of scoring) as the previous year.

My suspicion is that Pete allowed the "cooking" movement to start the 2020 season due to Russell's incredible efficiency last year, but once he hit a turnover streak in the middle of the season (10 in 4 games), Pete became much more cautious.

One core issue at play is this: though QB is the most important position on any football team, Pete assigns less value to it than other head coaches (not "de-valuing", per se, but rather "de-centralizing"). As can be observed from these next data points, QB play (in Pete's Seahawks teams) has some correlation to points scored, but not necessarily post-season success.

Play-by-Play Analysis

Generally speaking, the top chart is a positive reflection of Russell Wilson and the team when the line is lower (less passing attempts needed to score, which implies more explosive plays, better field position, and more efficiency), while the bottom chart is more positive when the line is higher (more points scored per play).

This year's Seahawks team scored the most points per play in Wilson's tenure as a Seahawk. However, both Super Bowl runs (2013 and 2014) look very different from the following years. During that two-year span, RW threw the ball less, had a worse TD-INT ratio (still above league average), and yet they scored more frequently per pass attempt and per play than most other seasons.

Most common reasons given: the Legion of Boom, Beast Mode, an incredible special teams unit, and, in essence, a team that de-centralized the quarterback position.

Every aspect of those teams was a threat. Any unit could score. Anyone could get a turnover (and yes, PC always philosophically counts "three-and-outs" as turnovers to the credit of the defense). That was Pete's definition of complementary football.

Granted, we could (and should) look at playcalling, offensive schemes, the use of play action, Russell's athleticism, and many other factors that impact the game, but there is a clear takeaway here. Pete wants this team to run HIS version of football again, and he has made that clear in multiple interviews. He believes that he knows the best, most consistent, most reliable way to win football games and establish a winning culture long-term, and he does not believe that the formula involves putting all the eggs in one basket.

Russell is known to be an incredibly humble human being, but this transition is the test: is he willing to "go back" to being the best "game manager" to ever play the game?

Is he willing to sacrifice personal statistical achievement in order to continue building postseason success and a Hall of Fame postseason resume?

Time will tell.